AfLC and Council 214 are parties to a master`s contract (MLA). Section 33.02 of the CGA deals with order-level negotiations, i.e. negotiations at the level of exclusive recognition. In section 33.02 v. of the GW, “the parties can agree on each other to delegate responsibility for negotiation to subordinate activities and local union officials.” Section 33.03 deals with activity-level negotiations and includes the provisions of Section 33.02 (c). Since the request for mid-term selection of mobility teams was not submitted by the exclusive representative or his representative, and it was not shown that Local`s exclusive representative in 1592 had delegated authority to negotiate the mobility team`s missions, Ogden was not required to negotiate with Local 1592 the tasks of the mobility team. Therefore, as ogden was not required to negotiate with Local in 1592, he did not engage in an unfair labour practice when she refused to do so. For a distinction to be found to be defective because it does not derive its essence from the collective agreement, it must be noted that the award (1) cannot be inferred in any rational way from the agreement; (2) is so unfounded and inconsistent with the wording and objectives of the collective agreement that an infidelity with respect to the arbitrator`s duty is expressed; (3) is not a plausible interpretation of the agreement; or (4) a clear breach of the agreement. See z.B. United States Dep`t of Labor (OSHA), 34 FLRA 573, 575 (1990).
The Union argues that the arbitration award is not based on facts of non-compliance. The Union argues that the arbitration award is considered a “central fact” that the MOA was a binding agreement between AFMC and AFGE, Council 214. [ v62 p. 136 ] Opposition at 7 a.m. The UNION argues that “the MOA certainly applies only to workers in afMC`s bargaining unit,… Often, uns negotiated employees do not benefit from collective agreements. See id. The judge placed the events of this case in the chronological context of the evolution of the precedents applicable to the issues applicable in this case. Prior to 1987, the Authority had decided that the management of the company was not required to negotiate proposals for trade union bargaining in the medium term, unless management tried to change the terms of employment or the parties agreed on a re-opening of the agreement. In National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 810 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. Cir.
1987), the Tribunal set the Authority`s precedent for mid-term negotiations. The Tribunal overturned the Authority`s decisions and referred the matter to the Authority for a revised decision. The General Counsel argues that the judge`s interpretation of the FGA “destroys the equality of negotiation that the Authority sought to establish in its decision on the Domestic Revenue Service.” Id. at 6. The General Counsel argues that the judge misinterpreted and applied the clear text of the parties` LDC. The General Counsel argues that, as the judge interprets, the AFLC may make changes during the duration of the agreement, but Local 1592 cannot initiate proposed amendments. The General Counsel argues that Shoell, in his dual role as President of Local 1592 and Executive Vice-President of Council 214, delegated the power to negotiate on behalf of Council 214. General Counsel states that if the AFLC decides not to delegate its bargaining power to Ogden, “it should be obliged to recognize Local in 1592 as a duly appointed representative of Council 214 and should be obliged to negotiate with the local.” Id. at 9. General Counsel states that GWG “Local 1592, the Council`s duly appointed representative, should not prevent the negotiation of mobility teams with someone.” Id. The judge also noted that Ogden`s absence from quoting a contractual defence, when he first responded to Local`s request in 1592 for a mid-term hearing on the selection of the mobility team, did not preclue the defence`s subsequent assertion.